DEFAMATION: CONFLICT IN THE DEFINITION
OF "PUBLIC FIGURE"
Competing interests, each of which society refuses to sacrifice,
necessitate a compromise. In the area of defamation, society's interest
in the freedoms of speech and of the press competes with society's
interest in compensating individuals whose reputations have been injured by defamatory falsehoods. The question arises as to which standard of liability best accommodates both interests.
At common law, liability was imposed without fault on publishers
of false and defamatory statements. 1 Such statements "constitut[ed] a
class of speech wholly unprotected by the First Amendment." 2 Typically, a prima facie case of defamation was established by pleading
and proving a defamatory publication. 3 Unless defeated by the narrow defenses of truth or privilege, 4 damages automatically attached as
there existed a legal presumption that injury normally flows from the
fact of publication. 5 Since juries exercised "largely uncontrolled
discretion" in awarding presumed damages, the practical result was
substantial jury awards "as compensation for supposed damage[s] to
reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred."6

1 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). Defamatory statements are those
that injure reputation. Since defamation is comprised of the "twin torts of libel and slander," a
defamatory statement can be either written or oral. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

TORTS § 111, at 737, 739 (4th ed. 1971).
2 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). The freedom of speech, as protected by the first amendment, was never absolute. Ten of the fourteen
states which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution did not accord absolute protection for all
utterances. Of these states, thirteen provided for the prosecution of libelous statements. "'In
light of this history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was
not intended to protect every utterance.'" Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957).
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-56 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942).
3 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370-75 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 558 (1938). "Publication" is a term of art which requires that the
"defamation be communicated to some one other than the person defamed." W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 766 (4th ed. 1971).

4 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 372 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
5 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). Defamatory statements were
considered to be "inherently injurious" utterances, id. at 380 (White, J., dissenting), resulting
in "subtle and indirect" injuries. Id. at 373 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, "damages were presumed because of the impossibility of affixing an exact monetary amount for present and future
injury to the plaintiffs reputation, wounded feelings and humiliation, loss of business, and any
consequential physical illness or pain." Id. at 373 n.4. (White, J., dissenting).
6 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
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Punitive damages further exacerbated the potential for excessive judg7
ments.
Self-censorship was often the result of the common law of defamation for it compelled a publisher or broadcaster '"to guarantee the
truth of all his factual assertions" under the threat of "virtually unlimited" libel judgments. 8 Because the common law in many instances
stifled to an unacceptable degree the first amendment freedoms of
expression, 9 it was inevitable that the competing interests would
strike a new balance. The case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'
provided the setting.
In 1960, the New York Times (Times), published a paid advertisement that was critical of the Montgomery, Alabama, police department's conduct toward Negro students participating in civil rights
demonstrations."
In an action for libel in the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County, Sullivan, the commissioner of the police department, established that factual inaccuracies within the advertise12
ment impliedly referred to him in his capacity as commissioner.
The jury awarded Sullivan $500,000 in damages, "the full amount
4
claimed,"' 13 which the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.'
Granting the Times' petition for certiorari, 15 the United States
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Alabama. 16 Delivering the opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan
reviewed the history of the first amendment and found to exist a

7 Id. at 350.
8 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). Rather than expose themselves to potential liability, a publisher or broadcaster might choose not to voice a factual assertion because, although they believed it or knew it to be true, they feared being unable to prove
its truth in court. id.
9 Id.
10 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'1 Id. at 256-58, 260. The advertisement stated falsely, inter alia, that " 'truckloads of police
armed with shotguns and teargas ringed the Alabama State College Campus,' " that the " 'dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve [the students] into submission' " and that the
- 'Southern violators [had] answered Dr. King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence,' " had bombed Dr. King's home and had arrested him seven times. Id. at 257-59.
12 Id. at 256, 258. Although the advertisement did not mention Sullivan by name, he contended that the use of "the word 'police' " and imputations to the police, such as " 'they' " and
" 'Southern violators,' " referred to him as the commissioner who supervised the police department. Id. at 258-59. The trial court agreed with Sullivan's contention. Id. at 263.
13 Id. at 256. Based on the same advertisement, four other libel suits were initiated against
the New York Times Company by local and state officials; the damages claimed totalled
$2,500,000. Id. at 278 n.18.
1 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
's New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 371 U.S. 946 (1963).
16 376 U.S. at 292.
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"profound national commitment" to uninhibited debate on public issues.' 7 Included within the scope of such debate was criticism of
government and its officials.'
Therefore, the advertisement, critical
of public officials and pertaining to the major public issue of civil
rights, qualified for constitutional protection.' 9 A question remained
as to whether that protection was forfeited by its false statements or
20
by its defamatory content.
Finding that both erroneous statements and statements injurious
to the reputations of public officials are inevitably included within the
scope of uninhibited debate, Justice Brennan' concluded that such
statements "must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to
have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive.' -21 Thus,
if the Constitution protects both false statements and defamatory
statements, the combination of the two, a false defamatory statement
directed at a public official's conduct, must also be protected. 22 To
buttress this conclusion, Justice Brennan drew an analogy to the Sedition Act of 1798.23 This Act, designed to punish those who
criticized or defamed public officials, was deemed to be inconsistent
with the first amendment. 24 Accordingly, state libel laws punishing
17 Id. at 270.
18 Id. at 270. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S.
353 (1937).
19 376 U.S. at 271.
20 Id. See also note 1 supra and accompanying text.
21 376 U.S. at 271-72. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
22 Id. at 273. This conclusion was significant because it had been "the consistent view of the
Court" that the constitution did not protect defamatory falsehoods. Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). Prior to New York Times, the protection
of citizens' reputations "ha[d] been almost exclusively the business of [the] state courts and
legislatures." Id. at 369-70 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, the Court had carved out a limited
exception to the common law of defamation by according first amendment protection to defamatorv falsehoods directed at the conduct of public officials. 376 U.S. at 273. See note 2 supra
and accompanying text.
23 376 U.S. at 273-76. The Act made it a crime for a person to
write, print, utter or publish ...
any false, scandalous and malicious writing or
writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress . . . or the President . . ., with intent to defame . . . or to bring them, or
either of them, into contempt or disrespute; or to excite against them, or either or
any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States.
376 U.S. at 273-74 (quoting the Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74 § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798)). Violations
were punishable by a $5,000 fine and five years in prison. Id. at 273.
24 Id. at 273-76. The Sedition Act of 1798 was "a criminal libel act never tested in [the
Supreme] Court and one which expired by its terms three years after enactment.'" Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 356 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). "The general concensus
was that the Act constituted a regrettable legislative exercise plainly in violation of the First
Amendment." Id. at 356-67 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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critics of official conduct who failed to prove the truth of their assertions were also inconsistent with the first amendment as applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. 25 Because such laws
induced an intolerable level of self-censorship, 2 6 it was essential that
there exist "[a] defense for erroneous statement[s] honestly made" in
27
addition to the defense of truth.
Attempting to achieve the proper balance between the competing interests, the Court enunciated a "federal rule," required by the
first and fourteenth amendments, which prohibits a state from awarding damages to a public official "for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves [with "convincing clarity" 28] that
the statement was made with 'actual malice.' -29 Thus, in the absence of actual malice, a false and defamatory statement directed at a
public official in his capacity as such was constitutionally privileged by
the first amendment. 30 The Court defined "actual malice" as "knowledge that [the defamatory statement] was false or reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not."31
Justice Brennan found that Sullivan, an elected city commissioner, was clearly a public official. 32 Consequently, to establish the
25 376 U.S. at 278-79.
26 ld
27

Id. at 278.

28 Id. at 285-86.
29 Id.at 279. The actual malice standard was made intentionally difficult to overcome to act

as "an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media self-censorship of the commonlaw rule of strict liability for libel and slander." It was clear that "many deserving plaintiffs,
including some intentionally subjected to injury, [would] be unable to surmount the barrier of the
New York Times test." Gertz v. Robert WAelch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
'o See generally 376 U.S. at 279.
"' Id. at 280. The Court clarified the meaning of the standard in New York Times and
subsequent cases. In New York Times, the Court concluded that the Times' publication of the
"advertisement without checking its accuracy against the news stories in the Times' own files"
did not establish the requisite "recklessness" required for a showing of actual malice. Additionally,
"[tihe mere presence of the stories in the files" did not establish that the Times " 'knew' "
the advertisement was false. Id. at 286-88 (emphasis in original). In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64 (1964), the Court held that the standard applied to criminal actions as well as civil
actions and that a statement made with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not required that the statement be made with a "high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity."
Id. at 74. The Court, in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), held that for "reckless
disregard" to exist, there must be "serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication." Thus,
the standard was a subjective one. Id. at 731. In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S.
81 (1967), the Court held that malice in the sense of ill will was not the same as the "actual
malice" standard of New York Times. Id. at 82.
12 376 U.S. at 283 n.23. The Court defined the scope of the public official designation in
subsequent cases. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), the Court held that public officials
are also those "government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Id. at 85. The Court, in
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liability of the Times, Sullivan had the burden of proving with convincing clarity that the defamatory advertisement was published with
actual malice and was related to his official conduct. The evidence did
not sustain a finding of actual malice on the part of the Times 3 3 and,
because the defamatory statement was an impersonal attack on a governmental operation rather than an attack on Sullivan as an individual
public official, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that
the statements referred to Sullivan. 3 4 The judgment was reversed
35
and the case remanded.
The Court extended the actual malice standard to defamatory
statements directed at public figures in the companion cases of Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker.3 6 Chief Justice Warren, concurring in the result of the plurality decision, formed
the basis of the majority thought to extend New York Times 3 7 when
he concluded that because the public interest in public figures is
often equal to that of the public interest in public officials, the first
amendment required some limitations on state libel laws as applied to

public figures. 38 The Chief Justice defined "public figures" as those
individuals who are "intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, [who] by reason of their fame, shape events
in areas of concern to society at large." 39 However, because public
figures, unlike public officials, are not subject to the restraints of the
political process, the Chief Justice reasoned that it was crucial that
the press be free to debate the involvement of public figures in pub-

Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1941), concluded that the standard applied to candidates for public office. Id. at 271. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Court held
that the standard applied to criticism concerning "anything which might touch on an official's
fitness for office." Id. at 77.
33 376 U.S. at 286-88. The Court found a statement made by the Times' secretary that "he
thought the advertisement was 'substantially correct' " to indicate an absence of malice at the
time of publication. The secretary's opinion was determined to be "a reasonable one, and there
was no evidence to impeach [his] good faith in holding it." Id. at 286. See note 30 supra and
accompanying text.
34 376 U.S. at 292. The Court held that a state "may not constitutionally . . . establish . . .
an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations [to be] a libel of an official responsible for those operations." Id.
35 Id.
36 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
37 Id. at 162. Four Justices, concurring in part in two separate opinions, agreed with the
Chief Justice's "adher[ence] to the New York Times standard in the case of "public figures' as
well as 'public officials.'" Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result); id. at 170 (Black &
Douglas, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 172 (Brennan & White, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
38 Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
39 Id. at 163--64 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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lic issues and events since such debate might very well be the only
means to influence their conduct. 40 Therefore, the Chief Justice
adopted the New York Times actual malice standard in the case of
public figures because it "affordled] the necessary insulation for the
fundamental interests which the First Amendment was designed to
41
protect."
In Rosenblatt v. Baer,42 a case concerning the scope of the public official designation, Justice Brennan stated that "[t]he thrust of
New York Times [was] that when interests in public discussion are
particularly strong, . . . the Constitution limits the protections afforded by the law of defamation." 4 3 This interpretation of New York
Times proved sound because the Court, having extended the qualified
constitutional privilege to defamatory falsehoods directed at public officials and public figures, next extended the privilege to defamatory
falsehoods concerning those private individuals who had become involved in matters of "public or general interest." 4 4 The initiative to
45
do so was provided by the case of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.
in which a jury rendered a three-quarter-million dollar verdict for a
46
private individual in a libel action against a radio station.
Rosenbloom, a distributor of allegedly obscene magazines, was
arrested while making a delivery to a retail newsstand in Philadel-

'0 Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
4l Id. at 164--65 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Butts involved a libel action arising from a false
accusation by the Saturday Evening Post that Wally Butts, the athletic director of the University, of Georgia, had conspired to fix a football game between the University of Georgia and the
University of Alabama. Butts had previously been the University's head football coach and was
"a well-known and respected figure in coaching ranks." Id. at 135-36. The Supreme
Court
found Butts to be a public figure, id. at 154, and aflrmed the damage award of $460,000 which
had been reduced by remittitur from $3,060,000. Id. at 138, 161. However, the standard
applied was not actual malice but a "highly unreasonable conduct" test. Id. at 155.
Walker involved a news dispatch that Walker, a well-known retired Army general, had
taken command of a violent crowd and personally led a charge against Federal Marshalls enforcing a Court decree ordering the enrollment of a Negro at the University of Mississippi. Id. at
140. In a libel action against Associated Press, a jury awarded Walker $800,000. Id. at 141.
Finding no evidence of actual malice, the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 158-59, 161-62.
42 383 U.S. 75 (1966). Rosenbaltt concerned a supervisor of a county recreation area who
was allegedly libelled by a local newspaper column which implied that the supervisor had embezzled public monies. Id. at 77-78. The public official designation was held to include those
government employees who have "such apparent importance that the public has an independent
interest in the[ir] qualifications and performance." Id. at 86.
43 Id. at 86.
44 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971).
45 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
46 id. at 40.
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phia.4 7 Three days later, the police obtained a warrant and seized
Rosenbloom's entire inventory of books and magazines from his residence and his warehouse. 48 He was subsequently acquitted of criminal obscenity charges because his materials were found not to be
obscene as a matter of law. 4 9 Following his acquittal, he instituted
an action for libel against a radio station which, in reporting on the
arrest and judicial proceedings, had referred to him and his associates
as " 'smut distributors' " and " 'girlie-book peddlers' " and had unqualifiedly stated that the seized books and magazines were obscene. 50
Under Pennsylvania state law, these statements were false and defamatory and, accordingly, the jury returned a verdict for
Rosenbloom. 51 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
the actual malice standard was applicable and reversed. 52 The Su53
preme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
The Court, in a plurality opinion, noted that common to New
York Times and its progeny was a defamatory falsehood contained in a
newsmedia report of an event of " 'public or general interest.' "54
Accordingly, the plurality focused not on the public or private status
of the individual defamed as prior opinions had done, but on the
public's interest in certain events and the participants in those
events. 5 5 Accepting the New York Times conclusion that there exists
a " 'profound national commitment' " to uninhibited debate on " 'public issues,' " the plurality reasoned that a matter of "public or general
interest . . . cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual
did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved." 56 Therefore, the

47 Id. at 32. Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines throughout the Philadelphia metropolitan area. Id. His arrest was the result of "a series of enforcement actions under the city's
obscenity laws" directed at those newsstand operators who sold such materials. Id.
48 Id. at 33.
49 Id. at 36.
50 Id.

51 Id. at 37-40. On remittitur, the district court reduced the jury award from $750,000 to
$275,000. Id. at 40.
52 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1969), affd, 403 U.S. 29
(1971).
53 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 U.S. 904 (1970).
54 403 U.S. at 30-31 (footnote omitted). The eight participating judges announced their
views in five separate opinions, none of which commanded more than three votes. Id. at 30, 57,
62, 78.
55 id. at 44.
56 Id. at 43. (Court's emphasis) (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270). The plurality
used the term "public issues" set forth in New York Times to justify the applicability of the
actual malice standard turning on "matters of general or public interest." Id.
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Court held that the New York Times privilege should extend "to all
discussion and communication involving matters of public or general
concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous
or anonymous." 57 If a defamatory statement stemmed from an event
that was not of public interest, an individual would still recover under
the common law standard of liability without fault. 5 8 Thus, under
the public interest analysis, whether or not a defamatory statement
was constitutionally privileged depended on the Court's determination that the event giving rise to the defamation was or was not an
59
event of public or general concern.
Turning to the facts, the plurality found the proper enforcement
of criminal obscenity laws to be of vital community interest. 60 To
establish the liability of Metromedia, Inc., Rosenbloom had to prove
with "clear and convincing" evidence that the defamatory statements
were made with actual malice. 6 ' There was no evidence in the rec62
ord to sustain this burden.

7 Id. at 43-44. Thus, the plurality ceased analyzing the status of the plaintiff, that is, the
use of the public official, public figure and private individual designations developed in New
York Times and Butts, in favor of a "public interest" analysis which did not consider the status
of the plaintiff. Id.
s Id. at 44 n.12. The common law standard of strict liability was viewed as the controlling
standard for libels and slanders from which New York Times and Butts carved out narrow exceptions, that is, privileges, for defamatory falsehoods concerning public officials and public figures.
See notes 28-41 supra and accompanying text. The effect of the Rosenbloom "public interest"
analysis was to carve out an extremely broad privilege for defamatory falsehoods concerning
those individuals who became involved in matters of public interest. See note 57 supra.
" Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). The following are lower court
decisions which have defined the breadth of the Rosenbloom "public interest" privilege: Post v.
Oregonian Publishing Co., 268 Or. 214, 519 P.2d 1258 (1974) (plaintiff incorrectly named by
police as drug smuggling suspect to be involved in matter of public interest); Mistrot v. True
Detective Publishing Corp., 467 F.2d 122, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1972) (story concerning double
murder which stated plaintiff to be present was story involving matter of public interest);
Schwartz v. Time, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 769, 337 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127, 129 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1972) (article on organized crime which characterized plaintiff as being gambler and unsavory to
be matter of public interest).
60 403 U.S. at 43.

'" Id. at 52. In contrast, the Court in New York Times required that actual malice be proven
with convincing clarity. 376 U.S. at 285-86. It is reasonable to assume that the convincing
clarity and clear and convincing standards are one and the same since the plurality in
Rosenbloom used the terms interchangeably. See 403 U.S. at 52, 55. The standards fall between
" 'preponderance of the evidence' " and " 'beyond a reasonable doubt' " because, historically,
the clear and convincing standard required a plaintiff in a civil case to bear more of a burden
than a " 'preponderance.'" J. NOWAK, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 18, at 782-83
(1st ed. 1978) (emphasis in original).
62 403 U.S. at 55.
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The plurality's decision to abandon the analysis of the status of
the person defamed in favor of a public interest analysis deprived an
individual, whether public or private, whether voluntarily or involuntarily involved in a matter of public interest, of recourse for injury to
his reputation unless he could satisfy the demanding requirements of
the actual malice standard. 63 The analysis, formulated by a fragmented Court, proved too extreme to endure as it inadequately balanced the competing interests at stake.
Within three years, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 64 the Court
chose to adopt a less extreme position that was more protective of the
reputations of private individuals than was the position taken by the
Rosenbloom plurality. Following a Chicago policeman's conviction for
murder, the victim's family retained Elmer Gertz, an attorney, to
represent them in civil litigation against the policeman. 65 Gertz had
no connection with the criminal trial other than having attended the
coroner's inquest into the youth's death. 6 6 The American Opinion, a
monthly publication expressing the views of the John Birch Society,
published an article stating that the convicted officer had been
"framed" at the criminal trial and that the prosecution was part of a
67
communist conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies.
In addition, the 'article contained allegedly false and defamatory
statements; 68 it accused Gertz of engineering the "frame-up"; implied
that he had a criminal record; and labelled him "a 'Leninist' and a
69
'Communist-fronter' ' and a member of a socialist society.
Gertz filed an action for libel in a United States district court
which ruled that the New York Times standard was not applicable as
Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. 70 After the
jury rendered a verdict for Gertz, the court, on further reflection,
entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court concluded

63 Id.

at 43-44.

64 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

65 Id.
victed for
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.

at 325. The policeman had been prosecuted for homicide and was subsequently conmurder in the second degree. Id.
at 326.
at 325-26.
at 327.
at 326.

70 Id. at 327-28. Had Gertz been found to be a public official or public figure, a directed
verdict would have been required because the evidence did not sustain a finding of actual
malice. Id. at 328. The editor of the American Opinion "denied any knowledge of the falsity of
the statements concerning [Gertz]" and stated that he relied on the reputation of the article's
author, "a regular contributor to the magazine," and on the accuracy and authenticity of the
author's prior contributions to the American Opinion. Id. at 325, 328.
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that the New York Times standard was applicable due to the presence
of a public issue, the discussion of which was privileged without regard to the status of the person defamed. 7 1 After granting certiorari, 72 the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. 73
Rejecting the extension of the actual malice standard proposed
by the Rosenbloom plurality, 74 and approving of the extension of the
standard to public officials and public figures, 7 5 the Gertz Court concluded that the state interest in redressing wrongful injury to the
reputations required that a different standard should apply to private
individuals. 76 In contrast to the plurality in Rosenbloom, Justice
Powell, writing for the Court in Gertz, had "no difficulty in distinguishing among defamation plaintiffs," that is, categorizing plaintiffs
as public officials, public figures or private individuals. 7 7 Two justifications were advanced for these distinctions: self-help and voluntary
78
exposure to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood.
Self-help was defined as a defamation plaintiff's ability to use "available opportunities" to rebut a defamatory statement, thereby minimizing its adverse effect on the plaintiff's reputation. 7 9 Because public
persons usually possess sufficient access to the media, they have effective opportunities to rebut injurious statements 80° Private persons, lacking such opportunities because they enjoy little or no media
access, are more vulnerable to injury, and are therefore more deserving of protection. 81 The more important distinction enunciated by
the Court was that public persons, unlike private persons, voluntarily
expose themselves to public scrutiny, thereby increasing the risk of
injury from defamatory comments. 8 2 Even if a public person has not
voluntarily run this risk, the media is entitled to assume otherwise,
whereas "[n]o such assumption is justified with respect to a private

71 Id. at 329. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.

72 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 410 U.S. 925 (1973).
73 418 U.S. at 352.
14 Id. at 346. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
75 418 U.S. at 343. The Court found New York Times and Butts to be "correct." Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 344. The plurality in Rosenbloom abandoned these distinctions, reasoning that "the

First Amendment's impact upon state libel laws . .. derives from the question whether the
allegedly defamatory publication concerns a matter of public or general interest." 403 U.S. at
44. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
78 418 U.S. at 344-45.
79 Id. at 344.
80 Id.
81 Id.

82 id. at 344-45.
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individual" since "[hie has relinquished no part of his interest in the
protection of his own good name." 8 3
Since private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury
and more deserving of recovery than are public officials and public
figures, the Court determined that "the state interest in protecting
them is correspondingly greater." 84 Because the Rosenbloom extension
of the actual malice standard abridged this legitimate state interest to
an unacceptable degree, the Gertz Court rejected that extension
holding that private defamation plaintiffs were no longer required to
prove actual malice to establish a defendant's liability. 8 5 Additionally, the public interest analysis announced in Rosenbloom forced
judges on all levels to determine on an ad hoc basis which events or
issues are of public interest and which are not.8 6 "[D]oubt[ing] the
wisdom of committing this task to the conscience of [the] judges," the
Court in Gertz found such judicial determinations to be inappro87
priate.
Concluding that both liability without fault and actual malice
failed to adequately balance the competing interests, the Court held
that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual."8 8 Under this rule, to establish the liability of the media
defendant, the private plaintiff "must prove not only the defamatory
statement but also some degree of fault accompanying it." 8 9
Having removed the standard that shielded the media from liability to private defamation plaintiffs, the Gertz Court was once again
confronted with the possibility of self-censorship stemming from jury
awards of presumed and punitive damages. To temper this potential
chilling effect, the Court held that such plaintiffs, absent a showing of
actual malice, could recover damages for actual injury only. 90 Thus,
the states were no longer permitted to allow recovery of presumed or
punitive damages unless the plaintiff proved that the statements were
made with actual malice. 9 1
83 Id.
84

85
86
87
88

at 345.

at 344.
Id. at 346-47.
Id. at 346. See note 59 supra.
418 U.S. at 346.
Id. at 346-47. The Court stated that its holding obtains where "the substance of the
Id.

defamatory statement 'makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.' " Id. at 348 (quoting
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)).
89 418 U.S. at 392 (White, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 349-50. These damages had to be supported by "competent evidence." Id.
91 Id.

at 349.
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Since different standards applied to public persons and private
individuals, the Court had to determine the public or private status of
Gertz for the purpose of establishing whether he was subject to the
actual malice standard or to a state-defined standard. 92 Because there
was no basis to conclude that lie was a public official, 93 Gertz was
either a public figure or a private individual. To distinguish between
these two designations, the Court defined the public figure as an individual who "achieve[s] such pervasive fame or notoriety that lie beconies a public figure for all purposes" or an individual who "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy
and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In
either case, such persons assume special prominence in the resolution
of public qIuestions. ' 9 4 Although Gertz had been "active in community and professional affairs," the Court felt he could not be classified
as an "all purpose" public figure since he had not achieved general
fame or notoriety iii the community. 9 5 Noting that when determining an individual's status it was preferable to focus on "the nature and
extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy
giving rise to the defaniation," the Court concluded that Gertz had
taken no part in the crimiinal trial, had never discussed with the press
either the criminal or civil trial, and had limited his role at the
coroner's inquest to the representation of his private client. 96 While
Gertz did involve himself in a matter certain to receive extensive
publicity, "[h]e plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of [the]
public issue, nor did lie engage the public's attention in an attempt to
influence its outcome." 9 7 Therefore, in the opinion of the Court,
Gertz was not a Voluntary public figure but a private individual and
98
the actual malice standard was not applicable.
By requiring a private individual to iiake a showing of fault to
establish the media defendant's liability, and by limiting his recovery
to actual injury absent a showing of actual malice, Gert: shielded the
12

See id. at 343-46, 351.
93 Id. at 351. Appointed by the Mayor of Chicago, Gertz had served on housing committees

but did not hold a government position at the time of the defamatory publication. Id. The Court
rejected the contention that Gertz, due to his presence at the coroner's inquest, was rendered a

'de facto public official.' " Id.
114Id. The Court noted that the instance of the involuntary public figure, those drawn into a
public controversy "through no purposeful action of [their] own," "must be exceedingly rare."
id. at 345, 351.

95 Id.at 351-52.
96 Id. at 352.
97 ld.
98 Id. at 352.
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media from the common law rigors of liability without fault and punitive and presumed damages. 9 9 The Court's decision to use the defamed person's status rather than the Rosenbloom public interest
analysis as the vehicle for determining the applicability of the actual
malice standard recognized, unlike the plurality in Rosenbloom, the
strength of the state interest in protecting the reputations of private
individuals. 100

The soundness of the Court's position in Gertz was tested for the
first time in Time, Inc. v. Firestone'01 which involved an inaccurate
report on the outcome of a divorce proceeding. Mrs. Firestone had
filed a complaint for separate maintenance from her husband, Russell
Firestone, 10 2 "an heir to the immense Firestone rubber fortune,"103
who counterclaimed for a divorce. 10 4 After a seventeen-month trial,

Mr. Firestone was granted a divorce on the sole ground of extreme
cruelty and Mrs. Firestone was awarded $3,000 per month in
alimony.

10 5

Describing the outcome of the litigation, Time

magazine (Time) published an article stating that Mrs. Firestone had
been divorced by her husband on the ground of extreme cruelty and
adultery' 0 6 when, in fact, the divorce had not been granted on the
ground of adultery.' 0 7 Upon the denial of her request for a retraction of the defamatory publication, Mrs. Firestone instituted a libel
action against Time in the Florida Circuit Court.' 0 8 A jury verdict
was rendered for Mrs. Firestone and judgment was entered against
Time for $100,000.109 The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the
99 Id. at 346-49.
Id. at 346-48. After "struggl[ing] for nearly a decade," the Court believed it had arrived
at an equitable accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of expression.
Id. at 325, 347-48. The Supreme Court handed down as a guide to all lower courts a definitive
ruling to bring consistency and stability to this area of the law.
101 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
102 Id. at 450.
103 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 271 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1972).
104 424 U.S. at 450.
500

105Id. at 451, 458-59.
Id. at 451-52. The following article, as quoted by the Court, appeared in Time magazines's
I06
Milestone section:
"DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone Jr., 41, heir to the tire fortune: Mary Alice
Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime Palm Beach schoolteacher; on
grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery; after six years of marriage, one son; in
West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony
of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, 'to make Dr. Freud's hair
curl.'

Id. at 452.
107 Id. at 458-59; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 271 So. 2d 745, 746 (Fla. 1972).
108 424 U.S. at 452.
109

Id.
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judgment of the Florida Circuit Court 10 and, on petition by Time,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari."'
Time contended that, because Mrs. Firestone was a public figure, its liability could only be established by a showing that the defamatory statements concerning Mrs. Firestone were published with
actual malice. 1 2 Responding to this contention, the Court, after
quoting in part the definition of "public figure" as formulated in
Gertz, held Mrs. Firestone not to be included in that classification. 113 The Court found that Mrs. Firestone had not assumed a
"role of especial prominence in the affairs of society other than
perhaps Palm Beach society" and had not thrust herself into a public
1 14
controversy to influence the issues involved.
Attempting to buttress its conclusion that Mrs. Firestone was not
a public figure, the Court, analyzing the nature of the event from
which the defamatory statements stemmed, noted that divorce
through judicial proceedings was not a "public controversy" as that
term was used in Gertz. 15 The Court reasoned that the public controversy that did arise from the litigation instituted by Mrs. Firestone
110 Id.
111 421 U.S. 909 (1975).
112 424 U.S. at 452-53.

453-55.
453, 454 n.3. The Court, failing to offer a supporting rationale, discussed the determination as to Mrs. Firestone's status by simply repeating the Gertz public figure definition
in the form of a conclusion. Id. Arguably, the Court's conclusion as to the private status of Mrs.
Firestone was incorrect. Mrs. Firestone was "well-known" to the public prior to the defamatory
publication. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 271 So.2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972). She had been the wife of
Russell Firestone, "the scion of one of America's wealthier industrial families." 424 U.S. at 450.
As an active member of the "sporting set" and "prominent among the '400' of Palm Beach
society," Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 271 So.2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972), Mrs. Firestone attracted
media protection sufficient "to warrant her subscribing to a press-clipping service." 424 U.S. at
485 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because of her social prominence, the seventeen-month divorce
trial was a " 'veritable cause celebre in social circles across the country' " which received national publicity and generated no fewer than eighty-eight newspaper articles in the Palm Beach
area alone. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). These facts go beyond revealing the divorce to be an
event of public interest to establish that Mrs. Firestone possessed the characteristics of an all
purpose public figure including fame and notoriety. Mrs. Firestone might also have qualified as
a voluntary public figure for purposes of limited discussion in relation to her divorce proceedings. She instituted litigation that was sure to attract public attention and voluntarily thrust
herself into the public eye by holding several press conferences during the divorce trial. Id. at
450, 454 n.3. Her ability to hold press conferences shows that she possessed the attributes of a
public figure as described in Gertz: self-help and willingness to voluntarily expose oneself to
public scrutiny. 418 U.S. at 344-45. See text accompanying notes 76-80 supra. If these actions
failed to establish that Mrs. Firestone "'volntarilv exposed [herself] to increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood," they were sufficient to justi' the media's assumption that such
exposure did exist. 418 U.S. at 345.
115 424 U.S. at 454.
113 Id. at
114 Id. at
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was not a result of her voluntarily choosing to publicize her divorce,
but was a result of the necessity to resort to a public forum, the
courtroom, in order to dissolve her marriage. 116 Mrs. Firestone was
"drawn into a public forum largely against [her] will in order to attempt to obtain the only redress available" to her. 1 17 "1I]n such an
instance '[r]esort to the judicial process . . . is no more voluntary in a
realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend [her]
interests in court.' "118 Thus, because Mrs. Firestone was involuntarily "drawn into" a public controversy not of the nature referred to
in Gertz, she was not a public figure and, therefore, did not have to
prove actual malice to establish liability." 9
The Supreme Court next addressed the subject of the limitedissue public figure three years later in Hutchinson v. Proxmire120 and
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,' 2 ' both of which were decided on the same day.
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, plaintiff Dr. Ronald Hutchinson was
a behavioral research scientist studying causes of animal and human
aggression whose research was funded by grants from various governmental agencies. 122 Defendant William Proxmire, a United States
Senator from Wisconsin, served on subcommittees of the Senate
Committee on Appropriations.' 23 He reviewed governmental spending and made recommendations on the desirability of appropriations
to the same agencies which funded Hutchinson's studies.' 2 4 In 1975,
Senator Proxmire established the " 'Golden Fleece of the Month
Award,' " a sarcastic award aimed at discouraging wasteful government spending through adverse publicity. 1 25 He assigned his legisla-

116

Id.

117

Id. at 457.

118 Id. at 454 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971)).
119 Id. at 454-55, 457. In addition, Time contended that the New York Times privilege
should be automatically extended to reports of judicial proceedings, including false and defamatory reports. Id. at 455. Finding no such blanket privilege in the Constitution, the Court
rejected the contention. Id. at 455-56. The Court, however, did cite with approval Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), which held "that the Constitution precludes States
from imposing civil liability based upon the publication of truthful information contained in
official court records open to public inspection." 424 U.S. at 455 (emphasis added).
120 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979).
121 99 S. Ct. 2701 (1979).
122 99 S. Ct. at 2677-78. His research was funded by government grants obtained from the
National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and other government agencies. Id.
123 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1316 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
124

Id.

125

(d.
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tive assistant, Schwartz, to investigate potential "Fleece" candidates
and to provide him with one example each month. 126 Selected by
Schwartz for a "Fleece" award were the government agencies which,
over a seven year period, had spent over a half-million dollars to fund
Hutchinson's aggression studies. 127

The award was the subject of a

speech on the Senate floor, a press release which was in essence a
text of the speech, and a newsletter mailed to Proxmire's constituents; all criticized Hutchinson and questioned the value of his
research.' 2 8 Hutchinson, claiming eight million dollars in damages,' 2 9 brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin against Senator Proxmire and
Schwartz, alleging, inter alia, defamation. 130 The defendants moved
for summary judgment claiming immunity under the speech or debate clause. 131 In addition, they claimed their statements concerning
Hutchinson were privileged under the first amendment because
Hutchinson was a public figure.13 2 Relying on both these grounds,
the district court granted the motion, 133 and the court of appeals affirmed.' 3 4 On a grant of certiorari,135 the United States Supreme
36
Court reversed. 1

126

Id.

127 99 S. Ct. at 2677-78.

128 Id. at 2678-79. In addition, Schwartz made follow up phone calls to the government
agencies to discuss their reactions to the award and Senator Proxmire commented on Hutchinson's award during radio and television interviews. Id. at 2679. Senator Proxmire was not certain if he delivered the speech on the Senate floor or inserted it into the Congressional record.
Id. at 2678 n.3.
129 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1315 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
99 S. Ct. at 2677, 2679.
131 Id. at 2679.
132 Id. at 2679-80.
130

133 431 F. Supp. 1311 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
114Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1978). Concerning the first amendment
issue, both lower courts found Hutchinson to be a public figure for the limited purpose of
comment on his receipt of federal funds for research projects. 579 F.2d at 1034-35; 431 F. Supp.
at 1327. This finding was based on Hutchinson's active solicitation of grants, his publication of
"numerous articles" regarding his research and "local press coverage" of his research and receipt
of federal grants. 579 F.2d at 1034-35; 431 F. Supp. at 1327. Additionally, because Hutchinson
responded to Proxmire's press release with his own press release, the court of appeals found
Hutchinson possessed sufficient access to the media to be designated a public figure. 579 F.2d
at 1035. However, the Supreme Court found that these factors failed to demonstrate "that
Hutchinson was a public figure prior to the controversy engendered by the Golden Fleece
Award." 99 S. Ct. at 2688 (emphasis added). The district court also found Hutchinson to be a
public official. 431 F. Supp. at 1327. However, because the court of appeals did not determine
the validity of that finding, the Supreme Court did not address the issue. 99 S. Ct. at 2680 n.8.
135 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. 832 (1978).
136 99 S. Ct. at 2688.
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After concluding that the speech, press release and the newsletter were not within the legislative process and, therefore, not protected by the speech or debate clause, the Court turned to the first
amendment issue.1 3 7 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
found Hutchinson to be no different from the other "countless members of his profession."138 His articles in professional journals were
1 39
not directed at the public, but at a small category of professionals.
The Chief Justice noted that if the effect of the "Fleece" award was to
make the subject of the articles a matter of controversy, such a controversy was not determinative of the public figure question because
a defamation defendant cannot draw attention to a private person
through defamatory statements, thereby transforming him into a public figure, and then base his defense on the public figure status of the
person defamed. 140 Similarly, because Hutchinson's media access
was created by the award, he did not enjoy "the regular and continuing access to the media that is one of the accoutrements of having
become a public figure." 141
Hutchinson had not thrust himself or his views into a public controversy by applying for and receiving government funds as there was
no identifiable controversy.' 42 There existed only a broad concern
about government spending which Hutchinson had not attempted to
influence. 143 Thus, because he had not "invited that degree of public attention and coinment on his receipt of federal grants essential to
meet the public figure level," Hutchinson was found to have retained
144
his private status.
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association involved a libel action
against the author and the publishers of a book which was alleged to
have incorrectly identified the plaintiff as a Soviet spy indicted for
espionage. 145 In January of 1957, as a result of a major investigation
137 Id. at 2681 n.10, 2687. The Court concluded that newsletters and press releases were
"primarily means of informing those outside the legislative forum." Id. at 2687. From this conclusion, it followed that the follow-up telephone calls and interviews were not protected. Id. at
2681 n.10. See also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1972); United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966).
138 99 S. Ct. at 2688.

139
140
141

142
143

Id,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

144 Id. Hutchinson v. Proxmire posed a question never before decided by the Court"whether the [actual malice] standard can apply to an individual defendant rather than to a
media defendant.'" The Court's conclusion that Hutchinson was not a public figure made it
unnecessary to decide the question. Id. at 2687 n.16.
14s 99 S. Ct. at 2703-04.
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by a federal grand jury into the activities of Soviet intelligence agents
in the United States, Myra and Jack Soble were arrested for, and
pleaded guilty to, espionage. 1 4 6 The Sobles' nephew, Ilya Wolston,
testified on various occasions before the grand jury. 147 He failed,
however, to respond to a subpoena requiring him to appear on July
1, 1958, and was charged with contempt. 148 After pleading guilty,
Wolston received a one-year suspended sentence and was placed on
probation for three years. 1 4 9 Reports of the contempt charge and
subsequent sentencing appeared in fifteen articles in various newspapers. 150 Thereafter, Wolston resumed "the private life he had led
prior to [the] issuance of the grand jury subpoena." 151 Sixteen years
later, in 1974, the book KGB, The Secret Work of Soviet Agents,
authored by John Barron and published by Reader's Digest, identified Wolston as a Soviet spy and contained an ambiguous passage
that could have been read as implying that Wolston's contempt conviction followed his indictment for espionage. 15 2 No such indictment
153
was in fact handed down.
In a diversity action brought against John Barron, Reader's Digest, and subsequent publishers of KGB, The Secret Work of Soviet
Agents in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-

146
147

Id. at 2704-05.
Id. at 2705.

148

Id.

Id. Wolston's sentence was "conditioned on his cooperation with the grand jury in any
further inquiries regarding Soviet espionage." Id.
150 Id. The articles appeared in Washington, D.C. and New York newspapers "during the
six-week period between [Wolston's] failure to appear before the grand jury and his sentencing." Id.
149

151 Id.
152

Id. at 2703. The passage read as follows:
Among Soviet agents identified in the United States were Elizabeth T.
Bentley, Edward Joseph Fitzgerald, William Ludwig Ullman, William Walter Remington, Franklin Victor Reno, Judith Coplon, Harry Gold, David Greenglass, Julius
and Ethel Rosenberg, Morton Sobell, William Perl, Alfred Dean Slack, Jack Soble,
Ilya Wolston, Alfred and Martha Stem.*
* No claim is made that this list is complete. It consists of Soviet agents
who were convicted of espionage or falsifying information or perjury and/or
contempt charges following espionage indictments or who fled to the Soviet
bloc to avoid prosecution ....

In addition, the index to KGB lists petitioner as follows: "Wolston, Ilya, Soviet
agent in U.S."
Id. (Court's emphasis) (citation omitted). The passage can be read as stating falsely that Wolston
had been convicted of contempt following his conviction for espionage or, as its author suggests,
that Wolston had been convicted of contempt following the conviction for espionage of others.
153 Id. at 2705.
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bia, 154 Wolston sought damages claiming that the passages were false
and defamatory. 155 The court declared him to be "a public figure for
the limited purpose of comment on his connection with, or involvement in, espionage in the 1940s and 1950s."1 5 6 Though the court
agreed that the passage "appear[ed] to state falsely that [Wolston] was
indicted for espionage," it concluded that the evidence raised no
genuine issue of fact as to the question of actual malice and, accordingly, granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. 15 7 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed. 158 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 159 and subsequently
reversed, holding that the lower courts had incorrectly determined
160
Wolston to be a public figure.
Though it was not at issue, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, found Wolston not to be a public figure for all purposes. 16 1
In contrast to those who possess " 'fame or notoriety' " or " 'persuasive power or influence,' "162 Wolston had "led a thoroughly private
existence prior to the grand jury inquiry and [had] returned to a position of relative obscurity after his sentencing." 163
The lower courts had found that by failing to comply with the
grand jury subpoena and thereby subjecting himself to a contempt
citation, Wolston had thrust himself into the public controversy surrounding the espionage investigation in a way that "invited [public]
attention and comment" and thereby had become a public figure for a
limited purpose.' 64 Disagreeing, Justice Rehnquist concluded that it
was "more accurate to say that [Wolston] was dragged unwillingly
into the controversy" by the government pursuant to its investigation. 1 65 The Justice explained that Gertz, in rejecting Rosenbloom,
154 Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 429 F. Supp. 167, 168 (D.D.C. 1977). Reader's Digest
was the initial publisher. The Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., MacMillan Book Clubs, Inc. and
Bantam Books, Inc. were also named as defendants because they, under contract with Reader's
Digest, subsequently published the books containing the defamatory falsehoods. 99 S. Ct. at
2703 n. 1.
155 99 S. Ct. at 2703--04.

156 429 F. Supp. at 176 (footnote omitted).
157 Id. at 180-81. There was no evidence to support a finding of actual malice because the
author's explanation of the ambiguous passage was "plausible and, in the court's opinion, offered
in good faith." Id. at 180.
15's Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
'59 Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 832 (1979).
160 99 S. Ct. at 2704.
161 Id. at 2706. The respondents did not contend that Wolston was an all-purpose public
figure. Id.
162 Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345).
163 Id.
14 See 578 F.2d at 431; 429 F. Supp. at 177 n.33.
19

99 S. Ct. at 2707.
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had clearly established the principle that a person's private status
cannot be forfeited by his voluntary association with an issue certain
to receive media exposure. 166 Accordingly, by choosing not to respond to the grand jury subpoena, a choice likely to invite commentary by the press, Wolston did not lose his private status. 16 7 Once
ensnared in the controversy, the private nature and limited extent of
his participation was consistent with that of a private individual rather
than a public figure.168 Wolston did not discuss his involvement
with the press and limited his participation "to that necessary to defend himself [against] the contempt charge" and accepted his
punishment passively. 16 9 Because Wolston had been dragged into a
controversy in which he attempted to remain a private man, Justice
Rehnquist "declin[ed] to hold that his mere citation for contempt rendered him a public figure for purposes of comment on the investigation of Soviet espionage."170
In accordance with Gertz, the Court defined the voluntary public
figure as one who not only thrusts himself into the public eye, but
does so as an attempt "to influence the resolution of the issues involved."171 Having found that Wolston did not inject himself into
the controversy, Justice Rehnquist also found no indication that his
non-compliance with the subpoena was "calculated to draw attention
to himself in order to invite public comment or [to] influence the
public with respect to any issue." 172 Rather, the evidence indicated
that Wolston's failure to obey the subpoena was the "result of his
poor health." 1 73 Since there existed "no basis whatsoever for concluding that [he had] relinquished, to any degree, his interest in the
protection of his own name," Wolston had not waived his status as a
74
private individual.1
166 Id. To hold otherwise would be to permit "mere newsworthiness" to be determinative of
the public figure issue, a proposition repudiated in Gertz. Id. at 2708. Elmer Gertz, an attorney, retained his private status despite his voluntary representation of a client in litigation
certain to receive extensive publicity. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. See text accompanying notes
95-98 supra.
167 99 S.

Ct. at 2707.

168 Id.

Id. at 2707-08.
Id. at 2707.
171 418 U.S. at 345.
172 99 S. Ct. at 2708.
173 Id. Wolston lived in Washington, D.C., and because the federal grand jury conducting
the investigation sat in New York City, Wolston, when subpoenaed "on various occasions," was
forced to travel to New York. Id. at 2705. Wolston claimed that he was unable to travel to New
York to testify on July 1, 1958, "because of his state of mental depression." Id.
174 Id. at 2708.
189
170
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Additionally, Justice Rehnquist rejected the second contention
advanced by the respondents "that any person who engages in criminal conduct automatically becomes a public figure for purposes of
comment on a limited range of issues relating to his conviction." 175
The Justice found no apparent reason why those "drawn into" a courtroom "largely against their will," whether to defend themselves or to
obtain redress, should "forfeit that degree of protection which the law
of defamation would otherwise afford them." 176 To hold otherwise
would have been to establish the unacceptable proposition that all
those engaging in crime are susceptible to unlimited defamatory criticism with no recourse for injury to their reputations unless they
17 7
satisfy the demanding burden of the actual malice standard.
Gertz stands today as the leading authority on the issue of public
figures. However, flaws inherent in the definition of the limited-issue
public figure prevent Gertz from functioning as the definitive ruling it
was intended to be. The definition established three criteria: there
must exist a public controversy, into which an individual has become
voluntarily or involuntarily involved, for the purpose of assuming special prominence in the resolution of the issues within the controversy. 178 The effect of the Court's inclusion of the term "public
controversy" within the definition, and its acknowledgment that an
individual may become a public figure through involuntary involvement in a public controversy was to breathe new life into the
Rosenbloom plurality opinion.
Rosenbloom stood for the proposition that the New York Times
privilege extended "to all discussion and communication involving
matters of public or general concern."179 The Court in Gertz repudiated the Rosenbloom public interest analysis not only because it
inadequately balanced the competing interests, but also on the basis

175 Id.
176

Id.

177 See id. at 2708-09. Concurring only in the result, Justice Blackmun observed that the

"passage of time" will often be relevant to the public figure issue since it may diminish a
defamation plaintiff's access to the media, "the means of counterargument," and "the 'risk of
public scrutiny' that a putative public figure may fairly be said to have assumed." Id. at 2709
(Blackmun, J., concurring). The Justice concluded that a "lapse of 16 years between [Wolston's]
participation in the espionage controversy and [the] defamatory reference to it was sufficient to
erase whatever public-figure attributes [Wolston] once may have possessed." Id. at 2710
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Thus, because Wolston was a private individual at the time he was
defamed in 1974, Justice Blackmun found no need to consider whether he was a public figure in
1958. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
178 418 U.S. at 345, 351.
179 403 U.S. at 44. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
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that it "occasion[ed] the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address[ed] issues of 'general or public interest' and which [did]
not." 180 Gertz determined such judicial inquiry into the public or
non-public nature of the event which gave rise to the defamation to
be improper.' 81 Thus, Gertz abandoned the term matters of "general or public interest" as the mechanism for determining the
applicability of the actual malice standard in favor of an analysis focusing on the public or private status of the defamation plaintiff.' 8 2 The
public figure definition was central to the Gertz status analysis in that
it functioned to aid in distinguishing between public figures and private individuals and thereby determined the applicability of the actual malice standard.' 8 3 However, the effect of the Court's inclusion
of the term "public controversy" in the public figure analysis was to
force judicial inquiry into the character of the event into which the
potential public figure had thrust himself, or had been drawn, for the
purpose of determining whether or not the matter was a public controversy.' 8 4 Thus, the Court in Gertz had resurrected the very difficulties that it had sought to avoid, as evidenced by the Firestone,
85
Hutchinson and Wolston opinions.'
As the result of such an inquiry, the Court in Firestone concluded that a divorce proceeding was "not the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz. " 186

This statement is clearly a reference

to the nature of the event giving rise to the defamation as opposed
to a reference to Mrs. Firestone's status. The Court's conclusion
appears to direct that two judicial inquiries are required by Gertz.
First, there must be a judicial determination as to the existence or
non-existence of a public controversy. If a public controversy is found
to exist, there must be an additional determination as to whether or
not that particular controversy is the sort of public controversy contemplated by the Court in Gertz. In Hutchinson, no identifiable public controversy was found to exist; "at most," there existed a "concern
about general public expenditures." 187 The Court in Wolston found
it "difficult to determine with precision the 'public controversy' into
180 418 U.S. at 346.
181 Id. at 346. See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
182 418 U.S. at 346 (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44).

183 See 418 U.S. at 343-46, 351. See text accompanying notes 25-89 supra.
184 418 U.S. at 345, 351.

185 See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 487 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 454.
187 99 S. Ct. at 2688.
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However,
which [Wolston was] alleged to have thrust himself."'
since Wolston failed to meet the other criteria established for public figure status, the Court accepted, arguendo, the existence of a
public controversy. 18 9
Having found judicial inquiry into the nature of the event to be
inappropriate, the Gertz Court could not have intended to approve
of such inquiry by its use of the term "public controversy." 190 However, because the decisions subsequent to Gertz have made no attempt to redefine the public figure without including language compelling judges to decide which defamatory statements address public
controversies and which do not, there is an indication that the Supreme Court, if not approving of such inquiries, at least acquiesces in
their use.
The involuntary public figure had its origin in the Rosenbloom
plurality opinion which permitted the New York Times privilege to
arise from the presence of a public issue without regard to the status
of a person defamed therein.' 9 1 The effect of this extension was to
deprive a private individual involuntarily associated with a matter of
public interest of compensation for injury to his reputation, unless he
192
satisfied the requirements of the actual malice standard.
A private individual, one who "has relinquished no part of his
interest in the protection of his own good name," 193 was nevertheless
stripped of this protection afforded him by the laws of defamation
through his involuntary involvement in an event of public interest. 19 4 It was precisely this inequitable result of the Rosenbloom
public interest analysis that the Court in Gertz sought to prevent by
holding voluntary exposure to increased risk of injury from defamatory
statements to be the "compelling normative consideration underlying
the distinction between public and private defamation plaintiffs." 195
In so holding, the Court sought a more appropriate accommodation of
the competing interests than that provided by the Rosenbloom plurality. 1 9 6

The Court reasoned that public figures, like public officials, are
less deserving of protection than are private individuals because they
188 99 S. Ct. at 2707 n.8.

189
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424
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U.S.
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U.S.
U.S.
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at
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488 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
43-44. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
43-44. See 418 U.S. at 337; see text accompanying note 63 supra.
345.

194 403 U. S. at 43-44. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
195 See 418 U.S. at 344-45; text accompanying notes 74-83 supra.
196 418 U.S. at 346.
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have chosen to become involved in the affairs of society.197 Therefore, they run "the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise
be the case" and "must accept [the] necessary consequences." 198 In
short, persons who "invite attention and comment" increase their
susceptibility to injury from defamatory criticism and, absent evidence of actual malice, should not be heard to complain when pained
by the sting of defamatory falsehoods. 19 9 In sharp contrast, the private person who becomes involuntarily involved in a public controversy has not assumed the risk of defamatory statements. 20 0 He
has not chosen to become involved in the affairs of society, nor has he
sought or invited public attention and comment. 20 1 Such an individual has not forfeited, to any degree, his interest in the protection
of his reputation and is consequently "more deserving of recovery"
for injury inflicted by defamatory falsehoods than is a public person.

20 2

Having designated voluntary exposure to public criticism as the
underlying distinction between private individuals and public persons, the Gertz Court proceeded to recognize that the public figure
status could arise either voluntarily or involuntarily. That is, if a private individual either "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a
particular public controversy," he "thereby becomes a public figure." 203 By providing for the existence of an involuntary public figure, the Court reinstated a concept, grounded in Rosenbloom, that it
had previously repudiated as unacceptable, a concept diametrically
04
opposed to the spirit of Gertz.2
It is against this background that the impact of the Firestone and
Wolston decisions on Gertz must be viewed. The Court's determinations
that Firestone and Wolston were private individuals turned in part on a
lack of voluntary involvement in a public controversy; Firestone had been "drawn into" a public controversy "largely against [her]
will" and Wolston had been "dragged unwillingly into a [public] controversy."205 In light of the Court's observation in Gertz that a private individual, through no voluntary action of his own, may

197

Id. at 344-45.
at 344.
Id. at 345.

198 Id.
199

203

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 345, 351.

204

See notes 74-85 supra and accompanying text.

200
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208 99 S. Ct. at 2707; 424 U.S. at 454-55, 457.
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nevertheless become a public figure by being "drawn into a particular
public controversy," 2 06 the Court appears to have been required to
consider the possibility of Firestone and Wolston qualifying as involuntary public figures. Instead, it chose to ignore the definition of
the involuntary public figure set forth in Gertz and, consequently, the
20 7
possibility was not considered.
The underlying but unexpressed rationale for the Court's refusal to
acknowledge the apparent involuntary public figure status of Firestone and Wolston is the same rationale underlying the rejection of
Rosenbloom in Gertz: those who have not "voluntarily exposed themselves
to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood" have not relinquished their interests in the protection of their reputations and, accordingly, are not properly subjected to the rigors of the actual malice standard.2 0 8 The Supreme Court, true to the express word of Gertz, might
have chosen to classify Firestone and Wolston as involuntary public
figures, which would have reinstated the inequity inherent in the
Rosenbloom public interest analysis. Instead, consistent with the spirit of
Gertz, the Court chose to ignore the definition and consequently determined Firestone and Wolston to be private individuals based, in part, on
20 9
their lack of voluntary involvement in a public controversy.
Given that the concept of an involuntary public figure is utterly
inconsistent with the spirit of Gertz, coupled with the fact that, since
Gertz, the Court, when twice confronted with plaintiffs who had the
potential to qualify as involuntary public figures, has twice classified those
plaintiffs as private individuals, it is apparent that the Court has rejected
sub silentio the possibility that a private individual may be drawn into a
public controversy, thereby becoming an involuntary public figure. The
Court appears to hold that an individual can be transformed into a
limited-issue public figure only if he voluntarily thrusts himself into a
public controversy. By so limiting the public figure definition in subsequent cases, the Court has established the accommodation of the
competing interests it intended to establish in Gertz.
Rather than defying the definition of the involuntary public figure, the Court could have determined Firestone and Wolston to be
private individuals on a more narrow ground consistent with both the
language and spirit of Gertz. In addition to requiring voluntary or
involuntary involvement in a public controversy, the definition mandates that "such persons assume special prominence in the resolution
206 418 U.S.
207 Wolston,
208 418 U.S.
209 Wolston,

at 345, 351. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
99 S. Ct. at 2706; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 351; Firestone, 424 U.S. at 453.
at 345, 344-47.

99 S. Ct. at 2707; Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454-55, 457.
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of [the] public questions" involved in the controversy. 2 10 Thus, a
person who becomes voluntarily or involuntarily involved in a public
controversy is a private individual with the potential to become a
public figure. It is not until he attempts to influence the public issues
involved that the potential public figure becomes, in fact, a public
figure.
Since the Court found Firestone and Wolston "assumed no 'special prominence in the resolution of public questions,' " neither could
be raised to the level of a public figure. 2 1' Thus, it was unnecessary
for the Court to establish the private status of Firestone and Wolston
based on their involuntary involvement in a public controversy. The
failure to use the more narrow ground as the basis for determining
the private status of Firestone and Wolston supports the conclusion
that the Court has ruled out the possibility of an involuntary public
figure.
The present state of the law appears to be that a person becomes
a limited-issue public figure only if he voluntarily involves himself in
a controversy in an attempt to influence the resolution of the issues
involved. As stated by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in
Wolston, "[t]he Court seems to hold ... that a person becomes a
limited-issue public figure only if he literally or figuratively 'mounts a
rostrum' to advocate a particular view." 212 Accordingly, the limitedissue public figure must be redefined to exclude both the term "public controversy" and the involuntary public figure. To do so would
lend clarity and consistency to a confused area of the law and would
ensure that effect is given to the "equitable boundary between the
2 13
competing concerns" that the Court in Gertz sought to provide.
Mark T. Karinja
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Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
Wolston, 99 S. Ct. at 2708 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351); Firestone, 424 U.S. at

454-55 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351).
212 99 S. Ct. at 2709 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun's statement accurately reflects the
majority's position. In addition to Wolston's involuntary involvement, the majority found no
evidence that his failure to appear before the grand jury was in any way "calculated to draw
attention to himself in order to invite public comment or influence the public with respect to
any issue." Id. at 2708. However, the Court suggested that if Wolston had "intended" to invite
a contempt citation as a method of "arous[ing] public sentiment in his fa-ior and against the
investigation," he would have been deemed a public figure. Id.
213 418 U.S. at 347-48.

